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An Elementary Approach to the Rule of  Law
Adriaan Bedner*
 
The past ten years have seen an avalanche of literature on the rule of law, but little
agreement on a definition of the concept – if it is defined at all. The present article
offers a conceptual framework to deal with this situation. Departing from the two
main functions the rule of law intends to serve – protecting citizens against the
state and against one another – it dissects the various definitions in use into ele-
ments. These elements are discussed one by one and arranged in three categories:
procedural elements, substantive elements and control mechanisms.
The result may not only be helpful in structuring debates about the rule of law,
but also in evaluating claims about the success or failure of ‘rule of law develop-
ment’. Finally, the article contains suggestions on how to use this framework as a
starting point for interdisciplinary research into the rule of law.
Introduction
While its huge popularity in political and developmental discourse suggests other-
wise, a short look at the literature demonstrates that the rule of  law concept is not
so easy to define. During the past decade many scholars attempted to determine
what rule of  law actually means, what it should mean, or at least what its core
features are or should be. These efforts have greatly helped our understanding of
rule of  law, but none of  them has yielded a definition acceptable to all. Rule of  law
definitions seem bound to vary over time, place, context, and from author to au-
thor.1
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According to Fallon this is not surprising, as rule of  law is an ‘essentially con-
tested concept’. This means that the ‘“true” meaning of  the Rule of  Law depends
on the resolution of  contestable normative issues’ and ‘disagreements are there-
fore to be expected’.2  Some of  this contestation about the rule of  law can be
resolved by taking into account the national context in which the concept is used.
For instance, it makes sense to consider a citizen’s right to trial by a jury as an
important element of  the rule of  law in a country with a commensurate tradition,
while its introduction in a criminal law system with another history would require
a complete and expensive legal-institutional overhaul without immediate benefit.
However, Fallon is right in pointing out that also within a single (national) con-
text rule of  law is contested. The problem with the ensuing debates – including
the academic ones – is that it is often not clear what they are about, since they are
often couched in rather general terms.3  This conceptual unclarity leads to confu-
sion, hinders meaningful comparative socio-legal research, and jeopardises devel-
opment projects claiming to enhance the rule of  law.4  It is the latter problem in
particular which breathes urgency to this matter and elevates it above the level of
an academic dispute. Since the 1990s the rule of  law has been at the vanguard of
‘good governance’ promotion in development co-operation, and billions of  dol-
lars have been spent on projects aimed at establishing it. Unfortunately the amounts
of  funding have not been matched by instances of  success and arguably this is at
least in part due to the absence of  agreement on what exactly these projects are
supposed to achieve beyond their immediate objectives. In the words of  Thomas
Carothers:
‘the question of where the essence of the rule of law actually resides and therefore
what should be the focal point of efforts to improve the rule of law remains nota-
bly unsettled. Rule-of-law practitioners have been following an institutional ap-
proach, concentrating on judiciaries, more out of instinct than well-researched
knowledge.’5
2 R. Fallon, ‘The Rule of  Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’, 97 Columbia Law
Review 1 (2007), p. 6, quoted in J. Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of  Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)’, 21 Law and Philosophy (2001). Waldron takes the issue even further, claiming that ‘we are
also unsure why we value [the rule of  law]’. However, this argument does not affect my approach as
I ‘neutralise’ the normativity of  the rule of  law by opting for the two functions’ approach set out
below.
3 For the non-academic debate this is even worse. For an excellent of  this point, see Waldron,
n. 2 above.
4 Cf., Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of  Rule of  Law’, p. 2.
5 Th. Carothers, ‘The Problem of  Knowledge’, in Carothers, Promoting the Rule of  Law Abroad: In
Search of  Knowledge, p. 21.
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Hence, there are good reasons to look for an analytically sound approach which
can resolve such problems, without having to give up the ‘adaptability’ of  the rule
of  law concept. This essay aims to contribute to that purpose by offering a con-
ceptual framework for structuring debates on the rule of  law, mainly building on
work done earlier by Peerenboom and Tamanaha. It may also be of  use to evalu-
ate the frameworks of  ‘rule of  law’– indicators, which are used and developed at
the initiative of  donor agencies. And finally, it may function as a starting point for
socio-legal research to render more effective projects supporting the rule of  law.
Two Functions of the Rule of Law
A preliminary matter that needs to be clarified is whether the object of  this in-
quiry is the rule of  law as it has been developed in the common law tradition, or
whether it also includes such equivalent notions as the rechtsstaat, état de droit, etc.
Given the purpose of  this essay, the obvious choice is to include such equivalents.
Not only are rule of  law and the rechtsstaat of  continental origin often used inter-
changeably,6  it is precisely the purpose of  this essay to indicate which features are
generally attributed to all of  them. Rule of  law is thus used as shorthand for the
English and American rule of  law, the German and Dutch rechtsstaat, the French
état de droit, the Indonesian negara hukum, etc.
This decision may suggest that this essay considers the rule of  law as a non-
essentialist or ‘empty’ concept. However, a solid common foundation exists to
start an inquiry into the rule of  law. There is indeed considerable disagreement
about rule of  law definitions, but virtually everyone agrees on the two main func-
tions the rule of  law serves.7
The first one is to curb arbitrary and inequitable use of  state power. The rule
of  law is an umbrella concept for a number of  legal and institutional instruments
to protect citizens against the power of  the state. This function of  the rule of  law
was first coined by Plato and Aristotle, subsequently lost for more than a thou-
sand years and then ‘rediscovered’ and elaborated by religious scholars – notably
Thomas Aquinas – during the Middles Ages. The core idea is that the sovereign is
bound by law, an idea elaborated in many ways since.8
6 See for instance R. Kranenburg, Het Nederlands staatsrecht, 1925.
7 One can obviously list many more functions or objectives served by the rule of  law, but these
are all somehow related to these two core ones. See Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of  Rule of  Law’, p. 3 and
the discussion of  Kleinfeld in this essay. In this manner the following enquiry is not a mere ‘ana-
tomical’ approach of  the rule of  law, as criticized by Martin Krygier, ‘The rule of  Law: Legality,
Teleology, Sociology’, in G. Palombella and N. Walker, Re-locating the Rule of  Law, 2008, pp. 45-69,
but comes closer to the teleological and sociological approach promoted by this author. See also the
conclusion to this article.
8 Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, pp. 7-9 and 18-19.
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The second function does not go back to Greek philosophy but, in the words
of  Kleinfeld came in ‘through the back door’ during the Enlightenment.9  It is to
protect citizens’ property and lives from infringements or assaults by fellow citi-
zens.10
Whether this second function must be considered equally important as the
first one has been the subject of  much debate. Some authors have argued that
currently there is a tendency to neglect the first ‘core’ function in favour of  the
second, and that we should not further inflate this second function, or even put it
outside the context of  the rule of  law.11  Nonetheless, there are strong reasons to
leave it in. The first is that it is central to many of  the current discussions concern-
ing the rule of  law and development. Dropping it would be missing the point of
many debates hung on the rule of  law peg. An additional reason for giving it a
central position is that human rights – considered by many to be an integral part
of  the rule of  law – have increasingly been used as a defining standard for rela-
tions between citizens and their fellow-citizens, and not only between states and
their citizens. The issue no longer is solely how the state treats its citizens, but also
how citizens treat one another. For that matter, violence against women has be-
come an integral part of  international human rights regimes, with CEDAW per-
haps the best-known example.12  This has important implications for states, which
have to prevent citizens from infringing on the rights of  their fellow citizens. Since
many authors discuss such issues in rule of  law terms it makes sense to consider
the second function as central to the rule of  law as well.
It is important to see that these functions tend to conflict. While Stephen Holmes
– among others – has convincingly argued that limitations on state power actually
increase the effectiveness of  this power,13  states often feel that they need more of
unfettered power than is actually good for them – and the argument often is that
9 Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of  the Rule of  Law’, p. 40.
10 This notion is more common to rule of  law than to rechtsstaat definitions. For an overview of
the historical distinction between the two see N.W. Barber, ‘The Rechtsstaat and the Rule of  Law’,
University of  Toronto Law Review (2003), pp. 443-454, quoted in HiiL, ‘Rule of  Law Inventory Re-
port’, Academic Part, Discussion Paper for the High Level expert Meeting on the Rule of  Law of
20th April 2007, p. 7.
11 E.g., J. Ohnesorge who warns the ‘jurists’ for losing their cherished rule of  law concept to the
‘economists’, who tend to focus on property rights only J. Ohnesorge, ‘The Rule of  Law, Economic
Development and Developmental States in Asia’, in C. Antons, Law and Development in East and
Southeast Asia, 2003, pp. 92-93.
12 The UN-Convention on Eliminating Discrimination Against Women (adopted in 1979).
13 S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of  Liberal Democracy, 1995, in particular
pp. 100-133. Holmes sets out his argument in an alternative reading of  Jean Bodin. The core of  the
matter is that while normatively sovereign power is unfettered, empirically it can be effective only if
it is felt as legitimate power by those subjected to it. The most effective means to achieve this is by
some form of  formal-rational organization of  its exercise.
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they need to protect citizens from one another. This tension between governability
and the aim of  the rule of  law to bind power is one of  the problems always visible
in debates concerning rule of  law promotion.14
Competing Definitions
The distinctions between definitions of  the rule of  law basically reflect views on
the desirability or the necessity to have particular ‘instruments’ in place to pro-
mote the twin functions discussed above, i.e., protecting citizens against the state
and protecting one citizen from the other. Such choices are inspired by views on
which instruments are best suited to attain an optimum balance between limita-
tions on state power and protecting citizens’ property and lives.
This raises a number of  questions which are at the heart of  the ‘essential con-
tests’ about rule of  law definitions. The first is which instruments potentially offer
the best guarantees to protect citizens against the state and fellow citizens, and
which connections exist between them. While the core instrument, to have the
state bound by law, benefits every citizen and therefore is ‘an unqualified human
good’,15  this does not apply to most others. Apart from the obvious question how
the state must be bound by law, one may wonder how important is it to have an
independent judiciary, how important is it to have human rights protected by a
written constitution, and whether it makes sense to have an independent judiciary
without human rights to protect. Answers to such questions are hard to provide,
as they depend on the context of  a given state or society.16  However, when
contextualised it is possible to render them operational – at least to an extent –
and to subject the effectiveness of  particular items to empirical testing.17
The second question is which of  the two functions the rule of  law is supposed
to serve should be prioritised if  they come into conflict. Is it possible to protect
citizens against terrorist attacks without reducing their right to privacy? Should we
14 In fact is was already present in the earliest projects within the Law and Development move-
ment. See J.A. Gardner, Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, 1980. See
also G. O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’, 9 Journal of  Democracy 3 (1998),
at p. 2.
15 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of  the Black Act, quoted in Tamanaha, On the
Rule of  Law, p. 137.
16 Cf., Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of  Rule of  Law’, p. 11.
17 Some scholars prefer to prevent such ‘internal’ comparison by leaving out some instruments
altogether. For instance, they prefer not to include democracy or human rights within their defini-
tion of  the rule of  law, which allows them to draw conclusions concerning the rule of  law without
having to address the ins and outs of  democracy as well. An example of  a forceful argument along
these lines is HiiL 2007. Not surprisingly, this approach was criticized by some of  the participants at
the meeting where the report was presented, who favoured a more inclusive, ‘aspiring’ definition.
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not give a broad, ill-defined mandate to the state to make sure that it can effec-
tively promote the rights of  cultural minorities?
This is a normative matter and escapes cross-case empirical evaluation. Being
an issue of  ideological preference and political choice it belongs to the realm of
political philosophy rather than socio-legal studies, although the latter can be helpful
in predicting or examining the consequences of  such choices. While some people
may prefer to sacrifice efficiency of  the state in order to realise maximum protec-
tion against it, others would rather increase efficiency at the expense of  protec-
tion. Socio-legal studies may assist in providing materials on which to judge the
likely effects of  policy choices in a given context, but they can never justify the
choice.
An important reason to pay attention to this issue is that many donor agencies
promoting rule of  law development pretend to promote something that is ‘be-
yond politics’. Their version of  the rule of  law is presented as a ‘universal good’,
while much of  it actually is not. Some donors even leave out certain ‘core’ instru-
ments of  the rule of  law competing with their own, usually economic objectives.
This serves their ends better than to admit that various rule of  law instruments
may actually compete.18
Some authoritarian regimes take this matter even further, stretching the defini-
tion of  rule of  law so far that one wonders whether anything is left of  it. They
may dismiss central rule of  law components such as the independence of  the
judiciary, but still claim that they adhere to the rule of  law doctrine in its entirety.
This can be easily explained from the universal appeal of  the word ‘rule of  law’.
Fully rejecting the rule of  law means taking a risk regarding a regime’s internal and
external legitimacy, just as completely rejecting democracy. It is politically advan-
tageous to claim that you stay within the boundaries of  the rule of  law, if  only a
‘different kind’ of  rule of  law.19  Governments will always find constitutional law-
yers prepared to underpin such claims with theoretical arguments.
The main conclusion we may draw from this short discussion is that in con-
trast to the degree of  unanimity on rule of  law functions, the common ground of
definitions is rather thin. It will be impossible to find a definition pleasing all and
therefore opting for yet another definition is not likely to bring much clarity to
rule of  law debates.
18 Cf., Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of  the Rule of  Law’, pp. 32-34 on this point. She
argues that at the basis of  the alternative definition of  donor agencies involved in rule of  law
projects is that they offer a practical focus for them. Although that may be true to some extent,
I think Ohnesorge is right in pointing out that underlying this focus is an agenda aimed at economic
development – thus valuing the second rule of  law function over the first one. See for a critical
analysis on this point J. Faundez, ‘The Rule of  Law Enterprise – Towards a Dialogue between
Practitioners and Academics’, 2005, CSGR Working Paper No. 164/05.
19 Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, p. 3; Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of  Rule of  Law’, p. 1.
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Dissecting Rule of Law Definitions
If  we depart from the two functions outlined above, we should be able to find an
alternative solution to the problems mentioned at the outset of  this essay. The
one proposed is relatively simple: instead of  talking about ‘the rule of  law’ as a
monomorphous concept for analytical purposes we should dissect it into elements.
This is not a new idea. Various authors have made attempts at classification
based on what could be labelled elements, 20  but most of  them offer no system-
atic approach and do not clearly explain why they include certain elements while
dismissing others.
There have been two approaches to achieve a more systematic classification.21
The first has been to make the now familiar distinction between formal and sub-
stantive versions of  the rule of  law – formal versions going back to the Greek
tradition and substantive to the Lockean fundamental rights approach. Formal
versions are concerned with law as an instrument and a basis of  government, but
are silent on what the law should regulate. Substantive versions, on the other hand,
set standards to the contents of  a norm, which should be morally justified.
The second approach to classification builds on the insight that rule of  law
definitions range from restricted (thin) to elaborate (thick) and that there is some
sequence in this. An example of  a thin definition is the following one by Raz:
‘The rule of law means literally what it says: the rule of laws. Taken in its broadest
sense this means that people should obey the law and be ruled by it.’22
Thicker definitions, generally include the thin definition, but add to it. This can be
seen, for instance, in the following, rather elaborate one by Thomas Carothers:
‘The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowl-
edge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and up-
hold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human
rights over the last half-century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the
right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The
central institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and police,
are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and indepen-
dent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important,
the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials ac-
cept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks
to be law-abiding.’23
20 E.g., B. Hager, ‘The Rule of  Law : A Lexicon of  Policy Makers’, 2000.
21 On this matter, see Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, in particular p. 91.
22 J. Raz, ‘The Rule of  Law and its Virtue’, in Raz, The Authority of  Law: Essays on Law and
Morality, 1979, pp. 210-232.
23 Carothers, Promoting the Rule of  Law Abroad, p. 4.
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Both Randall Peerenboom and Brian Tamanaha have used these two classifica-
tions to produce overviews of  elements in formal and substantive versions.24  This
essay further refines their models by paying separate attention to controlling mecha-
nisms and by presenting them in a more clear-cut form that can be readily applied.
This ‘elementary rule of  law model’ thus builds on the ‘formal-substantive’ dis-
tinction and the ‘thin-thick’ continuum.
However, before elaborating this, we first need to consider another approach
promoted by Kleinfeld. She distinguishes between means and ends of  the rule of
law and has argued that it makes more sense to take the ends as the distinguishing
feature, instead of  the means. According to Kleinfeld there are five ends: govern-
ment bound by law, equality before the law, law and order, predictable and effi-
cient justice, and lack of  state violation of  human rights. While her perspective is
original, Kleinfeld’s categories suffer from the same lack of  specificity as the for-
mal-substantive and the thin-thick distinctions. They are moreover not broad
enough to incorporate elements of  the rule of  law which are frequently argued to
be part of  it, for instance democracy. More problematic still is that Kleinfeld’s
claim that her categories cannot be reduced one to the other is unconvincing. For
instance, ‘lack of  state violation of  human rights’ likely requires that the govern-
ment is bound by law and that citizens are equal before the law.25
In fact, Kleinfeld’s ends can be easily related to the two functions, mentioned
earlier, with government bound by law, equality before the law and lack of  state
violation of  human rights as outcomes of  the ‘protection of  citizens against the
state’-function. Law and order, and predictable and efficient justice are related to
the ‘protecting citizens from each other’-function. The means Kleinfeld presents
to these ends fit therefore well into the scheme that will now be outlined.
The development of  this model consists of  three steps. Underlying the ap-
proach is a thorough analysis of  the concepts of  rule of  law in the literature.26
This first step is purely heuristic: its argument is not that certain elements ought to
be part of  the rule of  law concept, but rather which elements are claimed to be
part of  it according to the literature.
The second step has been to classify the elements found in three categories.
These are the well-known categories of  formal and substantive elements, but for
the sake of  clarity a third category has been added. Usually subsumed under for-
mal elements, ‘control mechanisms’ are of  such a different nature and so impor-
tant that they should have their own heading.
24 Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of  Rule of  Law’, pp. 1-13, Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, p. 93.
25 Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of  Rule of  Law’, pp. 34-46.
26 The review article by Marianne Termorshuizen. M. Termorshuizen,‘The Concept of  Rule of
Law’, Jentera: Jurnal Hukum, Vol. 2 (3), 2004, pp. 77-119 has been helpful as a starting point for this
purpose.
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The result of  this is a rule of  law conceptual framework that accommodates
the rule of  law concepts in use. This framework constitutes the basis for the third
and final step, which provides a point of  departure for rule of  law research. It
consists of  adding questions to each element. They are partly of  a legal nature and
partly empirical and must be further refined, ‘broken down’ and attuned to the
case or legal field studied.
This third step takes us to the last issue that needs to be addressed before
expounding the model. It concerns the distinction between norm and fact. The
matter is not so much that there would be disagreement about the question whether
the rule of  law is in place when a state is bound only legally, not in practice, or that
the rights of  its citizens are solely guaranteed on paper. Anyone will agree that a
state not following its own rules is not a rule of  law state. However, most – if  not
all – definitions also presuppose that citizens generally obey the law as well for the
rule of  law to be in place, even if  it addresses states in the first place.
If  we look at the first function, this condition seems superfluous. To protect
citizens against the state does not require citizens to obey the law. One exception
would be that citizens fail to use the means made available to them by the law to
offer them such protection, but that seems rather far-fetched. However, if  it comes
to the second function, the result is different. If  citizens do not follow the law
intended to protect their fellow citizens from assaults on their lives and proper-
ties, it means that the state fails to realise this function. It therefore seems correct
to look at citizens’ obedience to the law as well when trying to measure the ele-
ments of  the rule of  law intended to serve the second function.
The following sections will shortly discuss the elements per category.
1st Category: Procedural elements
– Rule by law
– State actions are subject to law
– Formal legality (law must be clear and certain in its content, accessible and
predictable for the subject, and general in its application)
– Democracy (consent determines or influences the content of the law and le-
gal actions)
Rule by law
The category of  procedural elements is concerned with the mode of  governing
and its legality. Present in any definition of  the rule of  law – even if  only implicitly
– is the first element of  that category, which is that the state rules by law. The origin
of  this element as a separate part of  the rule of  law is not quite clear, since the
earliest thinkers on rule of  law as Plato and Aristotle were more concerned with
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the issue of  the ruler being subject to the law,27  which is the next element. How-
ever, when Joseph Raz writes that ‘the rule of  law means literally what it says: the
rule of  laws’,28  he is referring to this demand in the first place. Law(s) here should
be understood as general rules and not as individual, arbitrary decrees. Moreover,
rule by law demands at least a minimum degree of  equality before the law.
‘Rule by law’ is commonly contrasted with ‘rule by men’, which carries with it
the connotation of  arbitrariness.29  In this sense rule by law is indeed the ultimate
foundation of  any attempt at curbing the exercise of  state power. On the other
hand, ‘rule by law’ is often juxtaposed with ‘rule of  law’, conveying a rather nega-
tive meaning upon it. It in fact suggests that the state has law at its disposal as a
powerful weapon without being subject to any restraint it inherently imposes.30
However, if  one considers the situation that the government rules by individual
decree only, it becomes clear that the requirement of  rule by law is vital. A state
such as the People’s Republic of  China comes close to adhering to this thinnest of
rule of  law versions31  and it is not difficult to see the advantage when we compare
it to the situation during the Cultural Revolution.
Rule by law furthermore already implies that law should in principle be general
in its content and that it should be known. The need for law being general be-
comes particularly clear from critiques on regimes that ‘rule by exception’. In this
situation general laws are set aside to make way for individual decrees, which re-
moves the guarantee for certainty present in the demand of  rule by law. The work
done on the ‘rule by exception’ also indicates that rule by law can be undermined
in a legal manner.32  That the state subverts this element if  it acts without any legal
basis, for instance by using vigilantes to remove citizens from their land, goes
without saying, but undermining its own general rules by deploying individual
decrees as it pleases may produce similar results.
A final note is that one should not underestimate how useful rule by law may
be for a ruler. Rule by law is the first step towards legitimacy based on rational-
legal government. Using general rules is moreover indispensable for governing
over larger numbers of  people in order to create clarity and stability where self-
regulation is not wanted or overruled. Any case of  state building at some point
27 Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, pp. 8-9.
28 Raz, ‘The Rule of  Law and its Virtue’, pp. 210-232.
29 See for instance D. Ivison, ‘Decolonizing the Rule of  Law: Mabo’s Case and Postcolonial
Constitutionalism’, Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies, 17 (2007) p. 262.
30 Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, p. 92.
31 For a more nuanced account, see R. Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of  Rule of  Law
in China’, in Peerenboom, Asian Discourses of  Rule of  Law: Theories and Implementation of  Law in Twelve
Asian Countries, France and the U.S., pp. 113-145.
32 K. Jayasurya, ‘The Exception Becomes the Norm: Law and Regimes of  exception in East
Asia’, 2 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 1 (2001), pp. 108-124.
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requires introducing rule by law, no matter how partial or awkward these attempts
may look from a contemporary perspective.33
Similarly, Shapiro has pointed out how in dispute resolution consent of  the
parties about the rules to be applied and consent about the third party deciding
the dispute have been substituted for law and office. These measures are required
for the ruler to be able to get a grip on society by having disputes decided along
the lines set out by the ruler. This also implies that any form of  centralised author-
ity will know a certain degree of  rule by law.34
State actions are subject to law
The second element in the procedural category can be labelled the common core
of  all rule of  law definitions. It first adds to the ‘rule by law’-element by requiring
a legal basis for every government act, the so-called principle of  legality. Lawmak-
ing also needs such a basis. Second, it demands that the government obey its own
rules. As already stated, this requirement goes back to Plato and Aristotle and is
strongly associated with the German concept of  ‘Rechtsstaat’ as set out in its ‘final’
form by Carl Schmitt, with its lack of  substantive and democratic elements.35
Limited originally by the idea that the sovereign can never be subject to law, since
he can change the law as he pleases, later on procedural demands set to law, de-
mocracy, and ideas about natural law have managed to overcome this problem.
The demand that every state action has a legal basis can be rendered meaning-
less if  this legal basis lacks specificity. A traditional area of  contestation here is the
issue of  discretionary power, perhaps better expressed in the German notion of
‘freies Ermessen’. Freies Ermessen attributes the government scope to freely deter-
mine its policies without having to account for them in any legal manner. This
recognises the impossibility and undesirability that the legislator determines every
33 See for instance A. Huxley, ‘Positivists and Buddhists: The Rise and Fall of  Anglo-Burmese
Ecclesiastical Law’, 26 Law & Social Inquiry 1 (2001), pp. 113-142 on Burmese law, or J. Ball, Indone-
sian Legal History 1602–1848, on Javanese law. As rightly pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, this
point reminds one of  the work of  Nonet and Selznick on types of  law (or rather legal systems), viz.
repressive, autonomous and responsive law Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law, 1978.
The type of  law referred to here is repressive law, but one should note that, as Nonet and Selznick
argue, even repressive law is defined in terms of  legitimation rather than sheer coercion. The next
element discussed means a move towards autonomous law, while the substantive law is associated
with the rights-approach discussed under the next category.
34 M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis, 1981. This is very clear from the history
of  colonial expansion; from the most limited form of  British ‘repugnancy clause’ to the myriad
categorization of  legal orders in the Netherlands Indies. See for examples, W.J. Mommsen and J.A.
de Moor, European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of  European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-
Century Africa and Asia, 1992.
35 C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 1928.
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government action in detail beforehand, but on the other it creates the danger that
the government will act in an arbitrary manner.36  Just as with the issue of  being
subject to the law, this problem has been tackled by jurists with the requirements
to law’s qualities inherent in the next element in this category and such administra-
tive law concepts as principles of  proper government.
The other problem with legality concerns so-called ‘open concepts’ in the law,
such as ‘the public interest’, the ‘common good’ and others, which can be filled in
by the government according to its own wishes and preferences. Probably no
notion has been misused as often as that of the ‘common interest’, although it is
impossible to altogether dispense with it or its equivalents. Just as the concept of
freies Ermessen, discretionary power points at the fact that ‘law’ is too general a
notion if  we want meaningful checks on state power. The simple postulate that
state actions should be subject to law is too broad to guarantee effective account-
ability. Therefore this notion is closely intertwined with the next element, which
specifies what the law should be.
Legality can also be subverted by the state by introducing laws, which provide
a legal basis for certain behaviour retroactively. This does not refer to the more
general understanding of  the principle of  non-retroactivity, meaning that citizens’
behaviour can be punished based on rules introduced after the event. It rather
resembles the ‘rule by exception’ in that it provides a legal justification of  state
behaviour where the state acted without a basis in law. It is an issue not often paid
attention to, but a fundamentally problematic way by which the state can loosen
the ties of  law.
There is another side to the principle of  legality, which does not involve the use
of  law and can only to a limited extent be countered by law. It also concerns the
requirement that the government in practice always acts on a legal basis, but is
more difficult to resolve than the previous problem in that it does not even pre-
tend legality by legalising behaviour retroactively. It involves both the situation
that state officials themselves act without a legal basis and the situation that the
state uses ‘ordinary citizens’ for this purpose, for example vigilantes. Of  course
one may establish legal rules and procedures to be followed to call the state to
order on this matter, but if  such behaviour is widespread even the most ‘liberal’
procedures applied by the most independent of  judiciaries cannot control it. In
the end it is the behaviour of  state bodies themselves which is decisive. In most, if
not all rule of  law conceptions this is a major litmus test to establish whether a
state can be labelled as obeying the rule of  law.
This also applies to the matter of  the state following its own rules and proce-
dures. No matter how obvious, because the rule of  law is traditionally a legal con-
36 See, e.g., N. Wimmer, Dynamische Verwaltungslehre: Ein Handbuch der Verwaltungsreform, 2004,
p. 198 et seq.
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cept this ‘practical’ side of  rule of  law is often disregarded. On the other hand,
those developing rule of  law indicators may lose sight of  the legal issues and only
focus on state practices.37  Particularly in this case it is important to distinguish
between the legal and the empirical sides of  the rule of  law concept.38
Formal legality
As already indicated under the previous headings, law must conform to certain
requirements if  it is to be effective in restraining the exercise of  power. Formal
legality enables citizens to plan their behaviour, as they can predict how the state
will respond. In fact, the previous two elements are meaningless to a large extent
if  formal legality is not in place as well.
While formal legality has a long history in fields as criminal law, where it pro-
vides the fundaments for the state’s mandate to punish citizens, more recently
theorists have come to focus on its importance for citizens’ behaviour in the eco-
nomic sphere. This means a shift from the first to the second function of  the rule
of  law. It goes back to Max Weber, who was the first to write extensively on the
importance of  formal-rational law for economic behaviour, but in fact the jurists
who during the Roman Empire elaborated and fine-tuned the rules of  civil law
were the forerunners of  this idea.
The idea that formal legality in combination with the right to property and an
independent judiciary, elements of  the other two categories, leads to economic
development has been extremely influential in international donors’ circles and
accounts for many projects conducted in this field. It is true indeed that for a
modern state formal legality can be a very powerful device to introduce the cer-
tainty required for economic development, with Singapore perhaps as the most
convincing example. However, there are also other ways to certainty, as there are
ways to legitimacy other than formal-rational.
Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that formal legality may serve this goal well
in any political system and arguably not only in modern states where clear codified
rules offer the best guarantees for transactions between people not tied to each
other by family or clan relations. The question is whether it can be achieved in
other ways than by codifications and case law. Although it is beyond this essay to
go further into this question, there are many examples of  such systems which
37 An example is D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and P. Zoidó-Lobaton, ‘Agregating Governance Indi-
cator’, World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/
IB/1999/10/23/000094946_99101105050593/additional/115515322_20041117135531.pdf.
38 The most sophisticated rule of  law indicators developed so far do take good account of  this
matter. See M.A. Agrast, et al., ‘The World Justice Project Rule of  Law Index: Measuring the Rule of
Law around the World’, see www.worldjustice.org.
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have been effective – and not in small-scale societies only.39  None the less, under
conditions of  stress, whether caused by migration, political turmoil, or other rea-
sons, published codes and case law do seem the most likely way to achieve this, in
particular on a larger scale.40
This applies certainly when it comes to bridle the state. The vaguer the rules,
the more difficult this is. It is no wonder that the only nation without a written
Constitution in the world is the United Kingdom, where the process to develop
an equivalent set of  rules to achieve state accountability started at a very early
point in history and is accordingly well-rooted.41  In this sense formal legality in-
deed qualifies as a ‘universal human good’. As Thompson also noted, ‘it is inher-
ent in the especial character of  law, as a body of  rules and procedures, that it shall
apply logical criteria with reference to to standards of  universality and equity’.42
In other words, formal legality is somehow inherent in the idea of  law itself.
Just as with the previous two elements, there is a legal and an institutional side
to formal legality. Determining whether rules are clear and consistent is probably
the essence of  legal scholarship, just as making the law accessible. There are obvi-
ously many debates about the proper way of  achieving this, for instance whether
law must be written, codified, restated or produced through case law, but basically
all these methods may be used to produce clear, certain, accessible and stable law.
In any legal system these will be the points of  departure for jurists, whether they
are compiling a code, passing a judgment, or making a contract.
This implies an important institutional requirement for formal legality, being
the existence of  a legal profession which shares the same outlook on law. If  seri-
ous divides exist among them, inevitably problems regarding formal legality will
arise. This also to some extent explains the problems with legal transplants, if
these have not been properly ‘tailored’ to the conditions of  the receiving coun-
try.43
However, before the legal profession can do its work, certain basic conditions
have to be fulfilled. Thus, if  case law is not published, it cannot be reordered, and
39 Japan is probably the best-known example.
40 However, the process of  transition will almost always be protracted, painful and problematic.
Imposing ‘alien’ rules on a given society has always been highly problematic, as has become more
than clear from studies on colonial societies, but also from those about France in the 18th and 19th
centuries. On the other hand, codifying local rules is also a delicate activity and will inevitably spur
disputes and reframe the power relations within that society. Unfortunately, the road in between of
providing non-binding ‘restatements’ of  customary law, as attempted by Van Vollenhoven in the
Netherlands Indies has proven very difficult too with regard to its application.
41 On the importance of  constitutions in this respect, see G. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional
Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 1997.
42 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of  the Black Act , at p. 262.
43 B. Seidman and A. Seidman, State and Law in the Development Process: Problem-solving and Institu-
tional Change in the Third World, 1994.
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if  laws are not published they cannot be commented on. Such very basic issues
determine whether a legal system can function at all or whether it cannot.44
Likewise, formal legality is associated with the down to earth issue as to whether
the law is known by those it addresses. This ranges from the most basic means as
the ‘drug is against the law’ signs on Jakarta airport, via comics explaining rights
on land to indigenous groups to the availability of  legal assistance, notably for the
poor and disadvantaged. It is formal legality that thus provides the first direct link
between the state-centred rule of  law concept with the citizen-centred access to
justice approach.
Democracy
While the previous elements in this category have been more or less generally
accepted as essential elements for the rule of  law, democracy is much less ac-
claimed as such. Although few will deny that democracy and rule of  law are closely
linked – for instance, in many countries it is common to speak of  the ‘democratic
Rechtsstaat’ and not the Rechtsstaat on its own – many will not include democracy as
an element of  a rule of  law definition.
This has both a theoretical and a practical side. First, democracy is sometimes
used in order to add a substantive element to the list of  formal requirements. It
argues that laws will be just if  they are informed by general consent. The most
sophisticated version of  this argument has been made by Habermas, whose argu-
ment is that in the absence of  natural law democratic procedures are the only
guarantee to just law we have. While there may be some truth in this, democracy is
in the end only a procedure, which can never guarantee a substantially just out-
come. Tamanaha has pointed out that for this reason democracy remains an ‘empty’
concept and moreover that democracy may yield very unfair laws.45
The practical reason not to include democracy into a rule of  law concept is that
if  one intends to say something about the rule of  law in a country, this makes it
even a more daunting task than it already is if  a more limited definition of  rule of
law is used. Democracy is a huge field of  research on its own and one easily over-
burdens oneself  by including it in the concept and then attempts to say something
useful about the rule of  law in a particular country. Within political science and
development studies it has its own place and this is another practical reason not to
bring it under the rule of  law banner.
Nonetheless, if  we return to the functions the rule of  law serves, it is clear that
democracy – at least liberal democracy – also serves the function of  protecting
44 See, for instance, on Indonesia G. Churchill, The Development of  Legal Information Systems in
Indonesia, 1992, Leiden: Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law and Administration in Non-Western
Countries, Research Report no. 1.
45 Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, pp. 99-101.
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citizens against the state. Making the government responsive to citizens is also a
means of  constraining its power,46  while a strong argument can be made that the
opportunity democracy offers citizens to pursue their goals by electoral means is
likely to reduce infringement on their fellow citizens’ rights and property.47
Democracy’s means, however, are not legal in the first place, but political – al-
though democratic rules are somehow cast into law as well and there is an empiri-
cal relationship between democracy and respect for human rights.48  If  one uses
the rule of  law as an ideal to pursue or as an inventory of  means to control the
state, then it does make sense to include it. Moreover, in order to be effective,
democracy needs many of  the checks implied in the elements previously dealt
with, as well as the fundamental freedoms that will be addressed in the next cat-
egory.49
One may also want to read a more limited form of  democracy into the rule of
law concept. This looks at the more local level of  law formation and government
decision-making and the influence citizens can have on those laws that directly
affect them. An example of  such a use of  the concept would be procedures for
participation in drafting a spatial plan or the principle that a citizen is heard before
a legal decision is taken by the government that will affect him or her. In the latter
example democracy is translated into a procedural device, which comes close to
the principles of  good government used to limit the exercise of  governmental
discretion.
2nd Category: Substantive Elements
– Subordination of all law and its interpretations to fundamental principles of
justice
– Protection of individual rights and liberties
– Furtherance of social human rights
– Protection of group rights
Subordination of  all law and its interpretations to fundamental principles of  justice
Where the previous category was concerned with procedures in order to prevent
misuse of  power, this category does the same by introducing substantive stan-
dards. Although no part of  thin definitions of  the rule of  law, this mechanism
46 Cf., L.J. Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 1999, at p. 3.
47 This, one could argue, caused the split between ‘revisionist’ social-democrats and radical so-
cialists preaching the revolution.
48 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, at p. 5.
49 See, for instance, G. O’Donnell, ‘Why the Rule of  Law Matters’, 15 Journal of  Democracy
4 (2004), pp. 32-46.
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goes back as far as the history of  the rule of  law. Both the Greek and the Romans
knew it in the form of  natural law. In fact, it is not difficult to relate the decline of
this standard to the decline of  natural law and the ascent of  positive law theories.
However, many who do not subscribe to natural law theories still recognise
substantive elements as part of  the rule of  law. The most ‘relative’ of  such ele-
ments consists of  principles of  justice, morality, fairness and due process. These
vary from one place to the other and over time and thus allow for a contextual
interpretation. Peerenboom has observed that even the thinnest rule of  law ver-
sions include a form of  substantive ‘context’, which could be brought under this
element.50  This also makes them useful for settings where customary law holds
sway, as one can judge the system by its own terms.
The relativity of  this approach is at the same time what makes it most vulner-
able to abuse. It is not always easy to define what are to be regarded as fundamen-
tal principles in a given social field – certainly not when it concerns a state that is
culturally diverse. Even in smaller and more homogeneous settings it may be dif-
ficult to determine which principles are so widely shared that they qualify as yard-
sticks for evaluating acts of  authorities. This is a problem legal anthropologists
have been accustomed to dealing with, but the carefulness and time required for
this purpose are often beyond the capacity of  those who have to test whether
indeed the authorities have abided by them. On the other hand, if  such principles
can be determined they are likely to be more stable than democratic outcomes, as
the latter will be susceptible to rapid political changes.
One may also add that this element is of  vital importance to the legitimacy of
the legal system in the eyes of  a state’s citizens. No matter how well procedural
elements’ prescriptions are followed, they cannot guarantee a substantively just
outcome of  the law’s application.51  And if  many consider the outcomes of  the
law as unjust the entire system may be endangered.
Protection of  individual rights and liberties
Included by many into their rule of  law definition, human rights to a large extent
subsume aspects of  the previous category, translated into such rights as fair trial.
Accepted by almost all the states in the world and with some of  them considered
as international customary law, individual rights and liberties are less flexible than
the principles of  justice and morality discussed above, which is at the same time
an advantage and a disadvantage. The growing body of  anthropological literature
on human rights reveals the importance of  contextualising them when using them
50 Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of  Rule of  Law’, pp. 5-6.
51 Cf., Nonet and Selznick’s idea of  ‘responsive’ law (above).
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as a yardstick for state behaviour52  and this argument is equally applicable to their
use within a rule of  law framework.
Perhaps the main reason to include human rights generally into the rule of  law
framework is that this field has become the central rallying theme of  development
co-operation and that gradually it has become clear that in order to achieve any
improvement in the realisation of  human rights – whether it concerns the right to
press freedom or to food – one needs an effective legal system to achieve this.
Bringing the two together into one concept creates a shorthand and an ideal that
is easy to be used to refer to human welfare and the legal framework required to
achieve this.
We should further be aware that the neoliberal ideology underlying most of
the activities of  organisations such as the World Bank makes it very attractive to
pursue this agenda under the rule of  law aegis. As already mentioned earlier in this
essay, international donors tend to subscribe to a very limited definition of  rule of
law, which emphasises rights to property, freedom of  contract and the legal mecha-
nism to enforce these.53  Faundez has pointed at the problems caused by notably
the World Bank’s failure to adequately address the relation between the develop-
ment goals pursued and the legal framework.54  Including human rights into the
definition of  rule of  law in the end may work out beneficially, as it should force
donor organisations and scholars to think through carefully the relations between
human rights and legal institutions. However, that does imply a broader concep-
tion of  human rights than the one picked by the World Bank.
A disadvantage of  including human rights into the definition of  the rule of  law
has already been discussed in the context of  democracy: it is such a vast field of  its
own that including it makes it difficult to say something ‘general’ about the rule of
law. On the other hand, the direct relation between such fundamental freedoms as
speech, assembly, fair trial, etc. to elements of  the formal category is quite clear
and does merit attention.55
Furtherance of  social human rights
While human rights are to be found in most current rule of  law definitions, this is
certainly not true to the so-called ‘social’ human rights. This is not surprising, as
52 See, e.g., M. Goodale, ‘Introduction: Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global
and the Local’, in M. Goodale and S.E. Merry, The Practice of  Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the
Global and the Local, 2008, pp. 1-38 and S.E. Merry, Human Rights and Violence against Women, 2005.
53 Ohnesorge, ‘The Rule of  Law, Economic Development and Developmental States in Asia’.
54 Faundez, ‘The Rule of  Law Enterprise – Towards a Dialogue between Practitioners and Aca-
demics’, pp. 5-8.
55 As suggested by one anonymous reviewer, it would make sense to actually develop a sub-
categorization of  those human rights which are particularly connected with the rule of  law.
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they are not directly concerned with preventing misuse of  power in the way all
elements mentioned so far have been: these rights creates the much further reach-
ing obligation for the state to use its power for the benefit of  its citizens, giving
them a right to food, shelter, education, etc. Whether such needs should be for-
mulated in the form of  rights is a question often debated, but practically speaking
more or less settled in favour with the adoption of  these rights into international
rights treaties and many constitutions worldwide.
An important definition incorporating these ‘second generation’ human rights
is the one formulated by the International Commission of  Jurists at its 1959 con-
gress:
‘The rule of law does indeed safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of
the individual in a free society; but it is also concerned with the establishment by
the state of social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which
man’s legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized. Freedom of expression is
meaningless to an illiterate; the right to vote may be perverted into an instrument
of tyranny exercised by demagogues over an unenlightened electorate; freedom
from government interference must not spell freedom to starve for the poor and
destitute.’
The strongest argument for including social rights into a rule of  law definition is
the second one: other parts of  the rule of  law can only function effectively if
social rights are fulfilled and therefore a rule of  law definition without makes little
sense for the poor and disadvantaged.
This approach is strongly contested by Tamanaha, who has argued that the rule
of  law tends to lose all of  its analytical value if  it is taken as broadly as this.56
While there is some truth to this, on the other hand the rule of  law concept at
present is not very analytically effective at all given the diversity of  definitions. In
other words, one is always required to define the rule of  law clearly before it can
be deployed for this purpose. If, on the other hand, the rule of  law is used as a
kind of  legal system’s ideal, guiding programs and people towards a better future,
then an all-encompassing notion may provide an effective shorthand for a whole
field of  mechanisms and ideas potentially contributing to serve the two functions
of  protecting citizens against the state and protecting citizens from one another.
The flipside of  this is obviously that it loses almost all of  its analytical value.
Protection of  group rights
The argument against including social human rights into one’s rule of  law defini-
tion applies even more strongly to this one. Not many defining the rule of  law
56 Tamanaha, On the Rule of  Law, p. 113.
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include group rights into their concept, as these are controversial to qualify as
human rights.57
On the other hand, some do, and it seems easier to fit them into a rule of  law
definition than the previous category. Group rights are by their nature closer to
individual rights and liberties than social rights, in the sense that they aim to re-
strain the state from interfering with the private sphere of  certain groups of  citi-
zens, whereas social rights are concerned with the active exercise of  power by the
state to promote citizens’ welfare. Only if  they are understood as implying the
duty for the state to actively promote them this changes. An example of  the latter
interpretation would be to require the state to provide funds for supporting the
use of  certain languages rather than just allowing groups to use these languages
for official communication. The most convincing reason to include group rights
into a rule of  law concept is that such rights can be a powerful weapon against the
state’s encroachment on citizens’ rights or of  other citizens, most likely in the
form of  large companies, doing the same. The gross injustices committed in this
way against indigenous or other groups provide compelling reasons to look at
group rights in the attempt to realise the functions pursued by the rule of  law.
3rd Category: Controlling Mechanisms (Guardian Institutions)
– An independent judiciary (sometimes broadened to trias politica)
– Other institutions charged with safeguarding elements of the rule of law
An independent judiciary
As already outlined above, independence of  the judiciary is usually listed as a for-
mal element of  the rule of  law, but its institutional nature in my view makes it
more apt to be discussed under a separate heading. One may add that the judiciary
is not only concerned with safeguarding the formal elements in the rule of  law.
This is not only empirically the case: as any scholar of  courts can tell us judges will
use all kinds of  mediatory techniques to attain an outcome that is acceptable to
the parties to a dispute. It is commonly accepted among legal theorists that judges
should try to achieve an outcome that is substantively just58  – and obviously they
should also take into account human rights. The judiciary does not limit itself  to
controlling whether the government has taken into account the formal elements
57 E.g., A. Kuper, ‘The Return of  the Native’, 44 Current Anthropology 3 (2004), pp. 389-402. Still
there are many references to group rights as part of  the rule of  law, most of  which see it as a natural
extension of  the concept. See, for instance, I. Brownlie, ‘Rights of  Peoples in Modern International
Law’, Bulletin of  the Australian Society of  Legal Philosophy, Special Issue: The Rights of  Peoples, 1985, at pp.
105-106.
58 The most prominent representant at present obviously being Dworkin.
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of  the rule of  law. Moreover, unlike the formal and substantive elements dis-
cussed sofar, the judiciary is an actor, whose task it is to guarantee that the govern-
ment and citizens obey the limitations set to their exercise of  power. It therefore
makes sense to coin a separate ‘actor’ category consisting of  controlling mecha-
nisms.
Coincidentally, the independent judiciary is also less old than the other ele-
ments discussed in the formal elements category. Although the distrust Plato and
Aristotle harboured against democracy already points at the need for an indepen-
dent authority to apply the law, it is not until Montesquieu that this was fully rea-
soned through. Following Montesquieu, some theoreticians even go beyond
independence of  the judiciary and also include the separation between executive
and legislature into their rule of  law definition.
In spite of  this relatively ‘novel’ origin, accounts of  legal processes in 17th cen-
tury England by such historians as Hay and Thompson show how important even
before Montesquieu the idea of  an independent judiciary was to the rule of  law.
The main insight from their analysis in this context is that application of  a law that
is skewed in favour of  the ruling classes obviously leads to unfair results, but that
this can be mitigated by an independent judiciary which may ensure that the law
will at least occasionally also work against individuals from this ruling class – evi-
denced by the (rare) death penalties imposed upon noblemen stretching the bor-
ders of  their privileged position too far.59
An independent judiciary is part of  virtually every definition of  the rule of  law,
except for those subscribed to by authoritarian countries such as Vietnam or China.
These argue that the judiciary should always serve the interests of  the state, which
objective is not different from non-authoritarian states, but then they assume the
state to be synonymous with the executive. However, aside from this view an
independent judiciary is generally subscribed to as an essential element of  the rule
of  law.
The fact that definitions always speak about independence of  the judiciary instead
of  impartiality reflects the priority most rule of  law definitions still attribute to the
protection of  citizens against the executive (and to a lesser extent the legislature).
Independence is the means through which impartiality should be achieved, the
latter an issue on which surprisingly little theoretical literature is available.60  This
cannot be said about the independence itself, which has been central to analyses
59 D. Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, in P. Beirne, and R. Quinney, Marxism and
Law, 1982, pp. 103-129.
60 Exceptions are C.M. Larkins, ‘Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical
and Conceptual Analysis’, 44 The American Journal of  Comparative Law (1996) and P.H. Russell and
D.M. O’Brien, Judicial Independence in the Age of  Democracy: Critical Perspectives from around the World,
2001.
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made by such diverse persons as political philosophers and legal reform practitio-
ners’ toolkit makers. While most of  this literature is concerned with state courts,
others have taken up the issue of  independence in relation to mediation and other
forms of  dispute resolution, which usually results in warnings for power dispari-
ties between the parties to a dispute.61
If  they are to be effective, judiciaries must not only be independent but also
accessible, their second quality required by this element. This means that the en-
tire debate about ‘access to justice’ and how it can be achieved becomes relevant
in the rule of  law context. As most of  this literature is indeed concerned with
access to courts, this makes sense. The more recent turn that access to justice is
conceived of  as access to a much broader range of  institutions, including non-
state ones, points at two issues relevant to this discussion: first, that the judiciary
does not have a monopoly on justice, and second, that the relation between the
judiciary and other dispute resolvers is also relevant to debates about the rule of
law. Nonetheless, few would argue that in the end an independent judiciary could
be dispensed with.62
While regarding all elements discussed so far their strictly ‘legal side’ seemed to
be at least as important as the empirical one, both independence of  and access to
the judiciary is more of  an empirical issue. This is somehow reflected in the gen-
eral trends in legal reform in developing countries. These used to be focused pri-
marily on lawmaking and legal education, but have since increasingly shifted to
court reform and more recently access to justice – thus paying more attention to
the structural and practical issues involved.
Other guardian institutions
Growing complexity in state organisation has led to increasing specialisation in
performing state functions and this trend has extended to the institutional side of
some rule of  law definitions. The past years have seen a spectacular growth in
‘guardian institutions’, charged with safeguarding particular aspects of  the rule of
law. A good example is national human rights institutions, whose number has
increased from only a few about twenty years ago to 120 at present.63  Another
61 Probably the champion of  such writing, both of  courts and alternative dispute resolution is
Mark Galanter. Important examples of  his work on this issue are M. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of  Legal Change’, 9 Law & Society Review (1974),
pp. 95-160 about courts, M. Galanter & J.K. Krishnan, ‘“Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice and
the Rights of  the Needy in India’, 55 Hastings Law Journal (2004), pp. 789-834 about ADR in India.
62 See for an overview of  the access to justice literature, R. Sandefur, ‘Access to Civil Justice and
Race, Class and Gender Inequality’, 34 Annual Review of  Sociology (2008), pp. 339-358.
63 For a list see http://www.nhri.net/nationaldatalist.asp, accessed on 21 April 2009.
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important institution is the Ombudsman, which has found its way into many sys-
tems, but one can think of  many other institutions overseeing state actions.64
The reason to include them in rule of  law definitions is that in many cases the
judiciary alone is not sufficient to protect citizens, which is a logical result of  the
rise of  the welfare state. Another particular feature of  these institutions is that
they are very much the outcome of  international or transnational processes. Thus,
national human rights institutions have been promoted heavily by the UN, while
Ombudsmen have been adopted by many countries from the Scandinavian model,
adapted to their own national circumstances.
An interesting feature of  such institutions is moreover that they are sometimes
introduced to replace a malfunctioning judiciary. Even if  there is no doubt that an
independent judiciary remains at the core of  controlling the executive, in certain
situations and fields their role has been taken over at least in part by Ombudsmen,
National Human Rights Committees, Anti-Corruption Courts, etc. – either as a
temporary measure or permanently. Hence, although they are not often explicitly
mentioned as a part of  the rule of  law they have become very important in realiz-
ing the first function of  the rule of  law in particular in many places and therefore
ought to be paid due attention.
The Elementary Model as a Research Tool
After this elaboration on the categories and the elements within them, this section
offers a first step towards using this model for research. Its aim is not to provide
an exhaustive list of  ‘rule of  law indicators’, but rather practical guideline for those
who want to do rule of  law-related research (although it may be helpful in assess-
ing rule of  law indicators schemes). It may also serve to sensitise researchers to
certain instruments used to curb government power or to provide ideas for those
who want to make policy recommendations on this issues.
The model is of  an interdisciplinary nature since the research questions look at
the elements from both a legal and an empirical perspective. The empirical ques-
tions are indispensable to obtain reliable information about the state of  certain
elements. For instance, if  we are talking about the independence of  the judiciary,
one should know about the conditions under which judges perform their tasks in
order to assess whether they are effectively independent or not. Thus, how are
judicial careers managed in practice, are judges exposed to terror, do they get to
know the results of  appeals against their judgments, etc. The result is an under-
standing of  the relation between rule of  law elements and contextual factors which
is lacking in much research. The approach thus tries to accommodate Martin
64 This includes election committees, anti-monopoly institutions, bodies overseeing fair trade
practices, commissions supervising the legality of  operations of  intelligence agencies, etc.
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Krygier’s observation that ‘the institutionalised norms need to count as a source of
restraint and a normative resource, usable and with some routine confidence used
in social life.’65
1st Category: Procedural elements – Related research questions
Rule by law
– to what extent does the government operate without using law?
– to what extent does the government use incidental measures instead of general
rules?
– to what extent does the government regulate the relations between its subjects by
law?
– to what extent are these laws followed?
State actions are subject to law
– to what extent does the law leave room for so-called ‘vrij bestuur’, ‘discretionary
powers’?
– are there exception clauses, allowing for special measures?
– does the government in effect base its actions on law (i.e. does the government
operate outside the law)?
Formal legality
– are laws juridically clear?
– are there retroactive laws?
– are there any exceptions in legislation?
– are laws stable (not changed all the time)?
– are laws applied generally (without discrimination)?
– are laws accessible:
a) are laws published?
b) are laws written in comprehensible language?
c) are laws socialised?
Democracy
– are there any mechanisms for stakeholder participation in making regulations?
– are there any mechanisms for stakeholder participation in making individual de-
crees?
– are these mechanisms accessible?
– are they effective?
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2nd Category: Substantive elements – Related research questions
Subordination of  all law and its interpretations to fundamental principles of  justice
– what are the applicable written principles of justice and of proper administration?
– what are the applicable unwritten principles of justice and of proper administration
and moral principles?
– to what extent are these conflicting?
– to what extent are law and its interpretations effectively subordinated to these
principles?
Protection of  individual rights and liberties
– to what extent are these legally guaranteed (including the question to what extent
they apply in the relations between citizens)?
– to what extent are these legal guarantees implemented?
Furtherance of  social human rights
– to what extent are these legally guaranteed?
– to what extent are these legal guarantees implemented?
Protection of  group rights
– to what extent are these legally guaranteed?
– to what extent are these legal guarantees implemented?
3rd Category: Controlling mechanisms – Research questions
There exists an independent judiciary
– is there an independent judiciary (i.e. tenure security, issues of court management,
etc.)?
– is the judiciary impartial (i.e. are there sufficient guarantees for ‘insulation’ from
outside pressure in a given case)?
– do citizens have effective access to the judiciary (in terms of standing, distance
from the court, costs, knowledge, legal aid, etc.)?
– do citizens get a fair and timely hearing by the court?
– does the judiciary dispose of adequate jurisdictionary and remedial powers?
– are judgments implemented?
There are other institutions charged with safeguarding elements of the rule of law
– are there such institutions and what is there legal mandate?
– how do they perform their functions and are they effective?
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Concluding Remarks
This essay has attempted to elaborate and further systematise the approaches by
Peerenboom and Tamanaha to ‘dissect’ the rule of  law concept into elements,
using the distinctions between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ and between ‘formal’ and ‘sub-
stantive’ as points of  departure. This has yielded a framework that hopes to con-
tribute to conceptual clarity, assisting participants to rule of  law debates to specify
more clearly what they are discussing. Moreover, it allows for meaningful com-
parison between various systems, as unlike their elements these systems in their
entirety often are incommensurable.
The model can also be used in another way. Because it takes the two basic
functions of  protecting citizens against the state and protecting citizens from one
another as its point of  departure, it can be helpful in realising the teleological and
sociological approach in rule of  law research promoted by Krygier.66  While Krygier
suggests to start with a clean slate, so to say, instead of  adopting the ‘juristic
anatomy’, I think it makes sense to use this ‘anatomy’ as a first point of  attention
for researchers interested in ways to realise the rule of  law functions. However,
one should not stop there and always be on the lookout for alternatives and other
constructions and options which may help realise these functions.
This framework may thus also help to underline the relevance of  rule of  law in
the context of  alternative normative orderings, for instance as based on Islamic or
‘traditional’ law. Rule of  law elements may also be relevant in checking the exercise
of  power in such non-modern state settings. Given the decline of  many strong
states and the resurgence or reinvention of  traditional (customary) structures and
other forms of  normative ordering this seems particularly relevant. Empirical re-
search in this field may also help to assess whether or not certain rule of  law
elements have universal value in curbing the use of  power and to what extent
alternative mechanisms are in place. The result is that rule of  law elements can be
evaluated in their context and that discarding an element in a certain context does
not necessarily lead to refuting the entire rule of  law concept. Once again, I want
to underline that the objective of  this framework is not to offer a definition, but
only to provide potential elements for it.
The main practical reason for this whole exercise has been my experience that
in research projects concerning rule of  law issues it is hard to find a ‘common
language’ to discuss them. This has also been the incentive to develop some ques-
tions for each element. The present essay has started as a very short, practical
internal memo for those involved in a research project carried out at the Van
Vollenhoven Institute and gradually evolved into something more. It has proven
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its use in this project and that has been an important reason to eventually commu-
nicate it to a wider public.
As all conceptual frameworks, this one will suffer from shortcomings and must be
seen as a start rather than an accomplished research tool. An obvious next step
would be to think through the relation of  the various elements listed – and poten-
tial additions – to the two functions set out at the start. Not all elements are equally
important for realising each of  these functions. Secondly, the research questions
should clearly be developed further. They can, however, be built on and can be
further developed on the basis of  socio-legal research. Likewise, one can think
about adding a special actor category for the executive, which – unlike the judi-
ciary – is never included separately into rule of  law definitions. Still, my hope is
that in its present form this model may already contribute to locating and organising
information about rule of  law practices that is now often scant, scattered and
unsystematic.
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